Why Hungary needs a redemocratisation plan

Whatever happens on 12 April, the EU is set to emerge from the Hungarian elections without a viable plan for the country’s future.

For years, Brussels has staked its entire strategy on a single, desperate wager that the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, will eventually be voted out of office. This is more wishful thinking than a political plan.

If Orban is defeated, there will be institutional relief and a hope that the country will correct itself. If he is not, Europe faces the continuation of a fifteen-year cycle of conditionality threats and legal disputes that have failed to change the regime’s trajectory.

The bloc’s passive approach has allowed a member state to function as a transmission belt for Russian and American interests from within the EU’s own institutions. By treating Orbán as an administrative nuisance to be managed rather than an existential threat to be confronted, EU leaders have presided over the conversion of a partner into a hostile actor, acting as a Trojan horse for both Putin and Trump.

This internal subversion demonstrates that Europe needs a structured ‘re-democratisation’ plan, specifically focused on member states escaping authoritarian capture.

While Hungary makes this need urgent, the problem is not unique. The recent history of Poland offers a sobering warning of what happens when Brussels mistakes a single election result for a total return to democracy. When Poland’s nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party lost power in October 2023, the European Commission responded with institutional euphoria. It unfroze billions in funding almost immediately, assuming that a change in leadership meant the system was repaired.

This proved to be a premature calculation. The new administration in Warsaw inherited a Constitutional Tribunal packed with loyalists, a president who systematically vetoed legislation, and an institutional architecture specifically designed to survive an electoral defeat. Two years on, Poland’s democratic restoration remains partial and fiercely contested at every level. Because Brussels declared victory and stepped back the moment the election was won, the new government was left to fight a captured state largely on its own.

This failure has exposed a major gap in the EU’s democracy toolkit. The bloc has well-developed instruments to prevent democratic backsliding, such as infringement proceedings and Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. However, it has no equivalent for supporting a member state trying to reverse that backsliding. Fighting democratic erosion and rebuilding a democracy are not the same task. They require different tools, distinct timelines, and multiple forms of engagement from Brussels.

The primary issue that EU leaders consistently overlook is that Orbán did not just occupy Hungarian institutions. He legally rebuilt them to entrench his authority beyond the reach of elections.

Experts call this ‘constitutional hardball’: the systematic use of formally legal instruments to make democratic reversal as difficult as possible. Hungary’s electoral system was redesigned so that even a substantial popular majority may not deliver a governing one. The presidency is empowered to obstruct and delay legislation, while the Constitutional Court is filled with loyalist appointees on twelve year terms. The EU’s rule-of-law conditionality addresses governmental non-compliance, but it cannot address a constitutional architecture engineered to outlast a change of government.

This is precisely what any post-election administration in Budapest will face. If Orbán’s main opponent, Péter Magyar, and his Tisza party win on 12 April, the EU’s instinct will be to treat this as vindication and return to normal engagement. This would be a repeat of the mistake made in Warsaw (and that even if Magyar gets a 2/3 majority). Magyar would inherit the full hardball architecture, and a defeated Orbán would not be a neutralised Orbán. Freed from governing constraints and backed by Russian resources and American political endorsement, Orbán would have every incentive to use his deep state of loyalist judges and officials to obstruct a new government. Without external support, a Magyar administration could be paralysed before it can demonstrate that democratic governance works.

The EU must finally acknowledge that Hungary’s alignment with Moscow is a security threat rather than a simple rule of law dispute. Evidence of direct coordination between Hungarian officials and the Kremlin confirms what has long been suspected. Hungary has shared sensitive information with Russia and systematically provided diplomatic cover for Moscow inside EU institutions. This forces a question no leader has yet been willing to name publicly: whether a member state that functions as a vector for hostile foreign influence can continue to exercise full membership rights, including access to classified security deliberations, without conditions.

A change of prime minister will not automatically solve this security exposure. However, a ‘re-democratisation’ plan could be implemented without the need for a treaty change.

This could be effected by institutionalising three areas. First, democratic reversibility as a condition of membership. The capacity to change governments without constitutional lock-in must be a standard linked to full membership rights. Second, structured reconstruction support. Unfreezing funds is necessary but insufficient. A genuine re-democratisation plan would require EU level engagement on contested appointments and sustained political solidarity against institutional obstruction. And, third, connections to hostile foreign powers must be treated as a security matter under existing cooperation obligations in EU treaties.

The EU cannot go on making things up as it goes along. The situation in Poland - and, potentially, in a post-Orban Hungary - evidence the need for a framework to support democratic reconstruction after authoritarian capture. A structure that commits the bloc’s institutions to accompany this process with legal, financial, and political tools is long overdue, and would help democratically-minded governments evade the institutional traps left by departing administrations.

This article appeared across European media outlet after its first appearance in

🇪🇺 EUobserver: https://euobserver.com/209118/brussels-has-no-plan-beyond-orban-losing-but-tusks-poland-shows-problems-of-re-democratisation/

🇪🇸 El País (Spain): https://elpais.com/opinion/2026-04-11/la-ue-necesita-un-plan-de-redemocratizacion-de-hungria.html

🇧🇪 La Libre (Belgium): https://www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/2026/04/09/hongrie-lillusion-du-changement-OTIICQELHRCWBEJFONR6CQKSIA/

🇩🇰 Politiken (Denmark): https://politiken.dk/debat/debatindlaeg/art10795811/F%C3%B8rende-demokratiforsker-Orban-har-sikret-sig-fortsat-stor-indflydelse-selv-hvis-han-taber-p%C3%A5-s%C3%B8ndag

🇦🇹 Der Standard (Austria): https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000315738/ungarn-braucht-weit-mehr-als-einen-machtwechsel

🇵🇹 Expresso (Portugal): https://expresso.pt/opiniao/2026-04-09-uma-derrota-de-orban-nao-chega-para-reconstruir-a-democracia-na-hungria-1ab0ac68

🇳🇱 BNNVARA/Joop (Netherlands): https://www.bnnvara.nl/joop/artikelen/hongaarse-ondermijning-toont-aan-dat-europa-behoefte-heeft-aan-gestructureerd-plan-voor-herdemocratisering

🇧🇬 Dnevnik (Bulgaria): https://www.dnevnik.bg/analizi/2026/04/07/4899910_es_niama_praktichen_plan_za_budeshteto_na_ungariia/663d85f9c053aeda1e605d7ce77c4a61/

🇭🇷 Poslovni Dnevnik (Croatia): https://www.poslovni.hr/kolumne/sa-ili-bez-orbana-eu-mora-imati-plan-za-madarsku-nakon-izbora-4531699

🇨🇿 Hospodarske Noviny (Czech Republic): https://archiv.hn.cz/c1-67863790-eu-musi-prestat-doufat-ze-volby-samy-vyresi-madarsky-problem-je-treba-prestavet-instituce-a-aktivne-blokovat-rusky-vliv

🇸🇰 SME (Slovakia): https://www.sme.sk/komentare/c/unia-caka-na-orbanov-pad-nema-vsak-plan-co-potom

🇸🇮 Delo (Slovenia): https://www.delo.si/mnenja/gostujoce-pero/madzarska-kaj-bo-po-volitvah-ce-jih-orban-izgubi

🇨🇭 Le Temps (Switzerland): https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/une-defaite-de-viktor-orban-ne-signifiera-pas-la-redemocratisation-de-la-hongrie

🇫🇷 Libération (France): coming soon

🇱🇺 Tageblatt (Luxembourg): coming soon

🇱🇹 Verslo Žinios (Lithuania): coming soon

🇬🇷 Ta Nea (Greece): coming soon